Mashups and Fair Use: The Bold Misadventures of the Seussian Starship Enterprise by Menell, Peter et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
8-15-2019 





University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
David Nimmer 
Irell & Manella LLP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, 
Jurisprudence Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Menell, Peter; Balganesh, Shyamkrishna; and Nimmer, David, "Mashups and Fair Use: The Bold 
Misadventures of the Seussian Starship Enterprise" (2019). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2220. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2220 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 
 
August 12, 2019 
 
Mashups and Fair Use:  
The Bold Misadventures of the Seussian Starship Enterprise  
 
Peter S. Menell,∗ Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ** and David Nimmer *** 
 
This amicus brief filed in the Ninth Circuit appeal of Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. ComicMix 
seeks to rectify and restore the balances underlying the Copyright Act of 1976—particularly the 
interplay of the Section 106(2) right to prepare derivative works and the fair use doctrine.  The 
District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that OH THE 
PLACES YOU’LL BOLDLY GO!—the defendants’ illustrated book combining Dr. Seuss’s OH THE 
PLACES YOU’LL GO! and other Dr. Seuss books with Star Trek characters and themes—made fair 
use of the Dr. Seuss works. 
Based on the works at issue, uncontested facts, and the judge’s factual findings, the 
amicus brief contends that defendants’ unauthorized derivative work plainly supported a grant of 
summary judgment for the plaintiff on the fair use defense.  The District Court’s conclusory 
finding that the defendants’ work is “highly transformative,” disregard of the second and third 
fair use factors, analysis of the fourth factor, and allocation of the burden of proof misapply the 
standards for fair use analysis.   
The District Court’s decision destabilizes essential copyright law principles that have 
long supported markets for collaborations and derivative works.  If this decision stands, 
competitors could flood publishing, television, film, and merchandising markets with 
unauthorized derivative works merely by “mashing” in other elements.  Lucasfilm could produce 
OH THE PLACES YODA’LL GO! without obtaining a license from Dr. Seuss Enterprises.  The 
developers of the Pokémon series could offer OH THE PLACES YOU’LL Pokémon GO!.  Castle 
Rock Entertainment could introduce OH THE PLACES YOU’LL Yada Yada Yada!.  Warner Bros. 
could freely mash together Bugs Bunny with Marvel Comic’s Iron Man or Sesame Street’s 
Kermit the Frog.  Moreover, anyone could produce and distribute such works.  That result 
contravenes what Congress intended in establishing an exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works subject to the fair use defense. 
While mashups can qualify for fair use in particular cases—for example, where they offer 
parodic or even satirical commentary and insights; or where a fan adapts his or her favorite 
characters or scenes for a school project—a categorical rule that commercial, non-parodic, non-
satirical mashups automatically qualify as “highly transformative” for purposes of fair use 
analysis goes well beyond the Copyright Act’s regime for promoting expressive creativity.  
Promoting mashup art beyond the limits set by copyright law’s exclusive rights, limiting 
doctrines, and fair use analysis may well be a desirable policy reform for the digital age.  Such a 
course, however, is for Congress and not the judiciary.   
                                                 
∗ Koret Professor of Law and Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University of 
California at Berkeley School of Law 
** Professor of Law, Penn Law 
*** Adjunct Faculty, UCLA Law 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 The authors of this brief are law professors at the University of California 
and the University of Pennsylvania who study and teach intellectual property law.  
Peter S. Menell holds a law degree and a doctorate degree in economics.  He 
has focused much of his research and teaching on intellectual property law.  Soon 
after joining the University of California at Berkeley School of Law faculty in 
1990, he laid the groundwork to establish the Berkeley Center for Law & 
Technology (BCLT), which he co-founded in 1995.  Professor Menell has authored 
or co-authored more than 100 articles and 15 books, including leading casebooks 
on intellectual property.  He has organized more than 60 intellectual property 
education programs for the Federal Judicial Center, including an annual multi-day 
program on “Intellectual Property in the Digital Age” since 1998.   He has advised 
the U.S. Congress, federal agencies, and state Attorneys General on a wide range 
of intellectual property and antitrust matters.  He served as Vice-Chair of the 
National Academies of Sciences project on copyright and innovation.  He 
presented the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.’s 42nd Annual Donald C. Brace 
Memorial Lecture in 2011.  
Shyamkrishna Balganesh is a Professor of Law at the University of 
Pennsylvania and researches and writes on copyright law and its connection to the 
common law. He has written extensively on the role of courts and judges in the 
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intellectual property system, and his most recent work explores the interaction 
between statutory law and judge-made law in the evolution of U.S. copyright law. 
His published work has appeared in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW, YALE LAW 
JOURNAL, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, and CALIFORNIA 
LAW REVIEW among other journals. 
David Nimmer teaches copyright and other subjects at the UCLA School of 
Law.  Since 1985, he has authored NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, the standard treatise on 
the subject which his father launched in 1963.  Besides publishing fifty articles, 
Professor Nimmer has lectured about U.S. and international copyright across the 
world.  In 2019, he delivered the Manges Lecture at Columbia University and the 
50th Year Commemoration for the Los Angeles Copyright Society.
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--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Copyright law’s fair use defense is one of the most vexing doctrines in all of 
the law.  From its emergence nearly two centuries ago through the present, courts 
have struggled with and lamented its complexity, unpredictability, and subjectivity.  
The reporters are replete with cases that could have gone either way. 
This case, however, does not fall into the gray area.  Based on the works at 
issue, uncontested facts, and the judge’s factual findings, the defendants’ 
unauthorized derivative work plainly supported a grant of summary judgment for 
the plaintiff on the fair use defense.  Defendants produced OH THE PLACES YOU’LL 
BOLDLY GO! [“BOLDLY”], a non-parodic mashup that combines Star Trek with Dr. 
Seuss’s OH THE PLACES YOU’LL GO! [“GO!”].  BOLDLY’s slavish use of 
imaginative graphic images and text from GO! results in a commercial work that 
would, if marketed, directly compete with GO!’s graduation season book sales and 
licensing marketplaces.  The result does not qualify for the fair use defense. 
  The district court’s conclusory finding that the defendants’ work is “highly 
transformative” and disregard of the second and third fair use factors misapply the 
standards for fair use analysis.  More troublingly, the court’s categorical 
determination that “mashups” are inherently “highly transformative” for purposes 
of fair use analysis improperly undermines the Copyright Act’s right to prepare 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436486 
2 
derivative works and the proper role for the fair use defense.  Moreover, the district 
court’s shifting of the burden of proof regarding market harm to the copyright 
owner contravenes basic tenets of civil procedure.  
The District Court’s decision destabilizes essential copyright law principles 
that have long supported markets for collaborations and derivative works.  If this 
decision stands, competitors could flood publishing, television, film, and 
merchandising markets with unauthorized derivative works merely by “mashing” 
in other elements.  Lucasfilm could produce OH THE PLACES YODA’LL GO! without 
obtaining a license from Dr. Seuss Enterprises [“DSE”].  The developers of the 
Pokémon series could offer OH THE PLACES YOU’LL Pokémon GO!.  Castle Rock 
Entertainment could introduce OH THE PLACES YOU’LL Yada Yada Yada!.  Warner 
Bros. could freely mash together Bugs Bunny with Marvel Comic’s Iron Man or 
Sesame Street’s Kermit the Frog.   
Moreover, anyone could produce and distribute such works.  The defendants 
in this case did not license rights from the owners of the Star Trek series or DSE.  
That result contravenes what Congress intended in establishing an exclusive right 
to prepare derivative works subject to the fair use defense. 
While mashups can qualify for fair use in particular cases—for example, 
where they offer parodic or even satirical commentary and insights; or where a fan 
adapts his or her favorite characters or scenes for a school project—a categorical 
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rule that commercial, non-parodic, non-satirical mashups automatically qualify as 
“highly transformative” for purposes of fair use analysis goes well beyond the 
Copyright Act’s regime for promoting expressive creativity.  Reversing the district 
court’s decision, therefore, is critical to ensuring that the Copyright Act’s exclusive 
rights, limiting principles, and policies, and the licensing institutions and norms 
they have generated, continue to function effectively.  By contrast, affirming the 
district court’s decision would undermine Congress’s copyright protection 
framework and threaten chaos in the content industries. 
None of this is to suggest that the fair use doctrine is not an important 
feature of copyright law or that individuals should not be able to express their 
creativity or engage with influential works.  It is essential, however, that the courts 
not subvert the copyright system by holding that any mashup constitutes fair use.  
The District Court’s decision is not merely a slippery slope undercutting the 
statutory right to prepare derivative works; it is a precipice. 
Promoting mashup art beyond the limits set by copyright law’s exclusive 
rights, limiting doctrines, and fair use analysis may well be a desirable policy 
reform for the digital age.  Such a course, however, is for Congress and not the 
judiciary.   
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--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
ARGUMENT 
As copyright scholars who seek to promote a balanced copyright system and 
fidelity to legislative authority, we file this brief to rectify and restore the balances 
underlying the Copyright Act of 1976.  The factual background for this case is 
presented clearly in the District Court’s rulings.  After explaining the pertinent 
statutory provisions (17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2), 107) and their interplay, we focus on 
three principal errors made by the court below: (1) the conclusory determination 
that BOLDLY is “highly transformative”; (2) flawed analysis of the fair use factors; 
and (3) inappropriate shifting of the burden of proof of an affirmative defense on to 
the copyright owner.  The final section explores the larger licensing, institutional, 
remedial, and policy aspects of this case. 
I. The Copyright Act of 1976 
Since the nation’s founding, Congress and the courts have striven to promote 
expressive creativity through the development of a robust and balanced copyright 
system.  This case involves the interplay of the § 106(2) right to prepare derivative 
works and the § 107 fair use defense.   
The District Court’s hasty rejection of the relevance of the § 106(2) right—by 
blithely noting that copyright’s exclusive rights are subject to the fair use defense, 
see DSE v. ComicMix, 372 F.Supp.3d 1101, 1116 (S.D. Cal. 2019)—overlooks 
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important statutory context for understanding “transformativeness.”  Congress 
defines “derivative works” as works that “recast, transform[], or adapt[]” “pre-
existing works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).  If, as the District Court ruled, 
non-parodic, non-critical, conventional mashups are inherently “highly 
transformative” under § 107 and such finding resolves all of the factors in the 
defendant’s favor, then the right to prepare derivative works has no purchase for 
any adaptation that combines pre-existing works.  Congress did not intend such a 
broad exemption.  The resolution of this puzzle—and the dual meaning of 
“transform”—lies in a deeper understanding of Sections 106(2) and 107. 
A. Section 106(2): The Right to Prepare Derivative Works 
Pursuant to Art. I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress 
granted authors exclusive rights to books and other creative works for limited 
times.  The 1790 Act granted authors of books, maps, and charts exclusive time-
limited rights.  See 1790 Act, § 1, Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.  A dozen years later 
Congress recognized derivative work protection by extending copyright protection 
to prints.  See Act of 1802, § 3, Ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (imposing liability upon those 
“copy or sell, or cause to be engraved, etched, copied or sold, in the whole or in 
part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main design, or shall print, re-
print, or import for sale, or cause to be printed, re-printed, or imported for sale, any 
such print or prints, or any parts thereof, without the consent of the proprietor or 
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proprietors thereof” (emphasis added). 
The extent of adaptation rights remained murky during the 19th century, with 
some cases declining to find translations and creative abridgements to implicate the 
right to copy.  See, e.g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) 
(No. 13,514) (concerning German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin).  Congress 
removed any doubt in the 1909 Act, granting authors the exclusive right to 
“translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects or make any other 
version thereof if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; 
to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or 
adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model 
or design for a work of art.”  See 1909 Act, § 1(b), Pub. L. 349, 35 Stat. 1075. 
Congress explicated the derivative work right in the Copyright Act of 1976.  
Section 106(2) grants authors the exclusive right “to prepare derivative works 
based on the copyrighted work.”  The Act defines a “derivative work” as “a work 
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis 
added).   
Thus, a work that transforms a pre-existing work falls within the exclusive 
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rights of the owner of copyright in the pre-existing work.  Section 103(a) provides 
that “protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright 
subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been 
used unlawfully.”  See generally Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. 
Cal. 1989) (finding that a script about Rocky Balboa fighting a Russian boxer 
infringes the right to prepare derivative works).  All of the § 106 rights are subject 
to the § 107 defense.   
B. The Fair Use Defense 
Early court decisions recognized that “the question of piracy” often depends 
upon a balance of factors, giving rise to the fair use doctrine.  Folsom v. Marsh, 9 
F. Cas. 342, 344 (1841) (Story, J.).  Courts evolved the fair use doctrine through 
hundreds of published opinions over more than a century, ultimately leading 
Congress to codify the fair use defense in the 1976 Act: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106, the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by 
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107.1  In codifying this jurisprudence, Congress recognized the 
judiciary’s ongoing role in developing the fair use doctrine.  See Copyright Law 
Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 66 (1976). 
Drawing on Justice Story’s inquiry whether a new work merely “supersedes the 
objects” of the original creation or instead adds something new, Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. at 348, Judge Pierre Leval introduced the term “transformativeness” to 
elucidate fair use analysis: 
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on 
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.  The use 
must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner 
or for a different purpose from the original. . . . [If] the secondary use adds 
value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, 
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights 
and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use 
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society. 
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) 
(footnotes omitted, emphases added).  He did not, however, view “[t]he existence of 
                                           
1 Congress later applied fair use to newly enacted moral rights provision in § 
106A, Pub. L. 101-650, 90 Stat. 2546, § 607 (1990), and added the following in 
1992: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use 
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors,” Pub. L. 102–
492, Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 3145. 
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any identifiable transformative objective” as the end of the inquiry.  Id. at 1111.   
Judge Leval explained:  
Courts must consider the question of fair use for each challenged passage 
and not merely for the secondary work overall.  . . .  Simply to appraise the 
overall character of the challenged work tells little about whether the various 
quotations of the original author’s writings have a fair use purpose or merely 
supersede.   For example, in the recent cases of biographies of Igor 
Stravinsky and J.D. Salinger, although each biography overall served a 
useful, educational, and instructive purpose that tended to favor the 
defendant, some quotations from the writings of Stravinsky and Salinger 
were not justified by a strong transformative secondary objective.  The 
biographers took dazzling passages of the original writing because they 
made good reading, not because such quotation was vital to demonstrate an 
objective of the biographers.  These were takings of protected expression 
without sufficient transformative justification. 
Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111-12 (footnotes omitted). 
Drawing on Justice Story’s formulation, Judge Leval’s insights and terminology, 
and Congress’s preambular examples, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth 
Circuit’s ruling denying the fair use defense to 2 Live Crew’s parodic version of 
“Oh, Pretty Woman.”  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  
The Court’s decision did not, however, hold that a finding that a work is 
transformative runs the table of fair use factors.  To the contrary, the Court noted 
that even works with parodic elements could adversely affect the copyright owner’s 
legitimate potential markets and such effects must be carefully analyzed.  See id. at 
593-94.   
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C. Reconciling Section 106(2) and Fair Use Jurisprudence 
As noted above, use of the term “transformative” in fair use jurisprudence 
emerged long after passage of the 1976 Act.  Neither Judge Leval nor Justice Souter 
in Campbell expressly discussed the terminological overlap between § 101 
(definition of “derivative work”) and fair use jurisprudence, but it is clear that they 
did not intend for fair use to swallow a large portion of the right to prepare derivative 
works.  Absent constitutional violations, the judiciary cannot override Congress’s 
express statutory framework.  Thus, this terminology must be understood against the 
backdrop of the Copyright Act.  Judge Leval recognized that:  
The transformative justification must overcome factors favoring the 
copyright owner. A biographer or critic of a writer may contend that 
unlimited quotation enriches the portrait or justifies the criticism. The 
creator of a derivative work based on the original creation of another may 
claim absolute entitlement because of the transformation. Nonetheless, 
extensive takings may impinge on creative incentives. And the secondary 
user's claim under the first factor is weakened to the extent that her takings 
exceed the asserted justification. The justification will likely be outweighed 
if the takings are excessive and other factors favor the copyright owner. 
Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111. 
In discussing the fourth factor (effect on the potential market), often labeled the 
most important consideration, Justice Souter recognized that although “[t]he market 
for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would 
in general develop or license others to develop,” which likely excludes critical 
reviews or lampoons, works that comprise parody and other elements could 
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nonetheless harm legitimate derivative licensing markets such as the general market 
for rap music.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.  “Evidence of substantial harm to 
[such market] would weigh against a finding of fair use, because the licensing of 
derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 106(2) (copyright owner has rights to derivative works).”  Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 593.  In that manner, the Supreme Court’s fair use analysis recognized the 
continuing need to respect the copyright owner’s rights in derivatives. 
Judge Leval has more recently clarified the meaning of transformative as applied 
to § 106(2) and fair use analysis: 
Transformations of the sort producing fair use are usually of a different 
character from the transformations that produce derivatives.  In the fair use 
context, the word most frequently refers to the purpose of the copying—
ordinarily to communicate some kind of commentary about the original or 
provide information about it. . . . 
In the derivative context, by contrast, what Campbell refers to as the 
‘critical bearing’ of the secondary work will generally be absent.  The 
transformation involved in making a derivative is usually one of form or 
medium, offering the same work in a new version, form, medium, or shape, 
rather than offering information or commentary about the original. 
The classic understanding of derivatives is that they are works that 
represent the original author’s creative expression in a different medium or 
form to an audience that either is, or would be, motivated by appreciation of 
the original author’s creative expression. . . . 
See Pierre Leval, Campbell As Fair Use Blueprint, 90 WASH. L. REV. 597, 609-10 
(2015) (footnote omitted).  A few months ago, Judge Leval embroidered on those 
considerations to explain that 
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a common form of copying that is neither parodic nor satirical, where one 
simply piggybacks on a famous song, poem or passage, or logo, playing on 
public recognition of the original to give punch, or humor to a new, 
unrelated message.  Where the copying is essentially either to harness the 
expressive brilliance of the original for the delivery of the copier’s message, 
or to gain audience impact for the new message by free-riding on the fame 
of the original expression, courts should ponder whether such changes can 
qualify as transformative, whether they have arguable justification for 
copying.  It is difficult to see why the original author should not be entitled 
to a fee for licensing such a utilization of her work. 
Pierre Leval, Fair Use: A Ramble through the Bramble, NYU Proving IP 
Symposium, May 16, 2019, video available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGky_yG8dV8 (at 11:48 – 12:46). 
II. The District Court’s Errors 
BOLDLY is less deserving of fair use than a work condemned by Judge Leval 
which “simply piggybacks on a famous [work] playing on public recognition of the 
original to give punch, or humor to a new, unrelated message.”  Id.  Here the 
defendants did not even provide a “new, unrelated message.”  Yet the District 
Court collapsed the assessment of fair use by ruling that combining Star Trek 
characters, settings, and themes with the vivid imagery and prose of Dr. Seuss’s 
GO! (and other works) was “highly transformative.”  This produced a domino 
effect by which a conclusory judgment on transformativeness toppled the fair use 
factors.  
A. Evaluation of Transformativeness 
While BOLDLY might well strike a lay observer as clever, engaging, and even 
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transformative in a common parlance sense of the term, copyright’s fair use test 
demands more than a simplistic test.  As set forth in Part I, the inquiry focuses on 
whether the defendant’s work serves a different privileged purpose than the 
original work.  The § 107 preamble identifies “criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching[], scholarship, or research” as prototypical fair use purposes, none of 
which remotely characterize BOLDLY.  The District Court properly rejects the 
defendants’ assertion that BOLDLY parodies GO!, but nonetheless concludes that 
BOLDLY is transformative based on its allegedly different intrinsic purpose.  
According to the District Court, whereas GO! functions as an illustrated book with 
an uplifting message that would appeal to graduating high school and college 
seniors, BOLDLY offers an uplifting message in an illustrated book (drawing on 
GO!’S prose and imagery) “tailored to fans of Star Trek’s Original Series.”  See 
DSE v. ComicMix, 372 F.Supp.3d at 1115.  The District Court then sidesteps the 
more appropriate characterization: BOLDLY is a GO! sequel.  See id. at 1116. 
As the District Court correctly notes, derivative works can qualify for fair use.  
But without a different privileged purpose such as a criticism or commentary, they 
face a steep uphill climb.  Even parodies have to survive the justificatory gantlet.  
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (observing that if the defendant’s work “has no 
critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the 
alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid drudgery in working up 
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something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work 
diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of 
its commerciality, looms larger”).   
B. Consideration of the Fair Use Factors 
 Factor 1 (Purpose and Character of Use) 
Section 107(1) asks courts to consider “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes.”  Fair use jurisprudence emphasizes whether the defendant’s work merely 
supersedes the objects of the original or “is productive and employ[s] the quoted 
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”  See Leval, 
103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111 (footnote omitted).   
BOLDLY is an unabashedly commercial work that seeks to draw on GO!’s 
popularity.  It entertains and inspires its target audience in much the way as GO!  It 
parallels GO!’s creative style, imagery, and general purpose.  By combining Star 
Trek characters, themes, and space travel with GO!, BOLDLY only modestly adds new 
insight and understanding.  Dr. Seuss’s imaginative imagery already reflects 
alien/extra-terrestrial settings and characters.  This factor favors the plaintiff. 
 Factor 2 (Nature of Copyrighted Work)  
GO! is an imaginative, expressive, highly original work of graphic art and prose.  
This factor favors the plaintiff. 
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 Factor 3 (Amount and Substantiality of Copying) 
Drawing a questionable analogy to Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 
F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998), a case distinguishable by the thinness of the copyright there 
at issue, the District Court focuses its factor 3 analysis on one comparison: the covers 
of the two works.  See DSE v. ComicMix, 372 F.Supp.3d at 1118.  The only image 
at issue in Leibovitz was the magazine cover.  The District Court properly determined 
that the BOLDLY cover copies little from GO!’s cover.  We would go further and 
assert that BOLDLY’s cover likely does not even infringe GO!’s cover. 
 
These observations, however, are entirely beside the point—one must not judge 
a book by its cover.  Insofar as the covers in this case are legally significant, they 
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relate to the plaintiff’s trademark cause of action, not the copyright cause of action.  
More importantly, as Judge Leval notes, “[c]ourts must consider the question of fair 
use for each challenged passage [or image] and not merely for the secondary work 
overall [or its cover].”  Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111 (our bracketed text).  The 
following illustrations, not even analyzed by the District Court, demonstrate that 
BOLDLY (on the right) slavishly copied highly original illustrations from GO! and 






















BOLDLY essentially traces highly imaginative graphic images, color patterns, and 
compilations of artistic elements.  Such extensive copying cannot be justified by 
parodic, critical, or other privileged justification.  The third factor favors the 
plaintiff. 
 Factor 4 (Effect on Potential Market for Copyrighted Work) 
The fourth fair use factor examines the effect of the defendant’s work on the 
potential market(s) for the plaintiff’s work.  This factor  
requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the 
particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and 
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result 
in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market” for the original. 
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NIMMER § 13.05[A] [4], p. 13–102.61 (footnote omitted); accord, Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S., at 569, at 2235; Senate Report, p. 65; Folsom v. Marsh, 9 
F.Cas., at 349. The enquiry “must take account not only of harm to the 
original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.” Harper & 
Row, supra, 471 U.S. at 568. 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
In many fair use cases, determining the potential market(s) for the plaintiff’s 
work can be difficult.  This is not such a case.  GO! is a perennial bestseller during 
high school and college graduation season.  In addition, there is a robust market for 
licensing Dr. Seuss works for collaborative books, audiovisual works, clothing, and 
merchandise.  The defendants and their business partners recognized that BOLDLY 
would be a big hit during graduation season and could be exploited with posters, 
mugs, and other merchandise. 
Nonetheless, the District Court concluded that “Plaintiff has failed to sustain its 
burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that BOLDLY is likely 
substantially to harm the market for GO! or licensed derivatives of GO!.”  DSE v. 
ComicMix, 372 F.Supp.3d at 1120.  Even putting aside the District Court’s error in 
imposing the burden of proof for the fourth fair use factor on the plaintiff,2 the 
District Court’s ruling makes no sense. 
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Brick and mortar bookstores would undoubtedly stock BOLDLY in close 
proximity to GO! during graduation season.  Online search engines would quickly 
recommend these books to graduation gift shoppers.  It is not difficult to imagine 
that searches for GO! would return recommendations for BOLDLY.  Customers 
interested in an entertaining aspirational book for their grandchild, nephew, or niece 
would undoubtedly consider these books substitutes and choose the most 
appropriate—perhaps Go! for the humanities or law graduate and BOLDLY for the 
STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) graduate.  Unlike works that 
target audiences outside the original work’s market—such as 2 Live Crew’s parodic 
rap version of “Oh, Pretty Woman” or Alice Randall’s wrenching retelling of Gone 
with the Wind from the standpoint of slaves on the Tara plantation, see Suntrust v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001)—BOLDLY would supplant 
GO! sales.  
Plaintiff also demonstrated that GO! and other Dr. Seuss works enjoy a robust 
licensing market.  The District Court’s decision serves as open invitation for anyone 
to enter the market for Dr. Seuss mashups.  BOLDLY usurps the opportunity for DSE 
and the owners of the Star Trek series from pursuing collaboration.  Cf. Anderson v. 
Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).   
The District Court’s comparisons to Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), and Equals Three, LLC v. Jukin Media, Inc., 139 
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F.Supp.3d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2015), bear little relevance to the present case.  Google’s 
use of thumbnails of copyrighted images for purposes of its image search engine is 
transformative in a functional manner that bears no relationship to the present case.  
More directly, low resolution thumbnails do not compete with Perfect 10’s high 
resolution images.  To the contrary, Google’s image search engine might well drive 
demand for Perfect 10’s photographs.  Equals Three involved speculative potential 
markets unlike those at issue here. 
The fourth factor favors the plaintiff. 
 Balancing the Fair Use Factors 
Contrary to the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, 
the fair use factors favor the plaintiff.  BOLDY neither ridicules nor comments on 
GO! nor uses GO! to poke fun at Star Trek.  BOLDLY pays homage to both as it seeks 
to commercialize a derivative work.  While marketing a Star Trek themed version 
of GO! for STEM graduates appears to be a promising marketing idea, it nonetheless 
falls within plaintiff’s right to prepare derivative works.  If merely combining GO! 
with another work—such as Star Wars, Pokémon , and Seinfeld —qualified as a 
transformative fair use, little would remain of the § 106(2) right.  Fidelity to the 
Copyright Act requires that courts apply the fair use doctrine with due regard for 
copyright law’s right to prepare derivative works.  See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation 
LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2014).  DSE has licensed authors and 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436486 
21 
illustrators to publish several GO! derivative works.  This case does not implicate 
fundamental First Amendment concerns that would arise with critical commentary. 
Hence, BOLDLY is better viewed as an unauthorized derivative work that falls outside 
of the fair use defense.  
III. Licensing, Institutional, Remedial, and Policy Considerations 
Notwithstanding the District Court’s flawed application of the fair use doctrine, 
we would be disingenuous if we did not acknowledge our desire to experience the 
adventures of a Seussian Starship Enterprise.  The BOLDLY images and storyline 
combine memorable, engaging, and inspiring childhood memories.   
The Copyright Act offers multiple possibilities to launch that adventure.  First, 
Section 106(2) places the entitlement to pursue such a work squarely within the 
authority of DSE and the owner of the Star Trek franchise.  Those companies can 
offer their own mashup of Dr. Seuss and the Starship Enterprise.  This would be 
analogous to Sylvester Stallone’s production of Rocky IV (arguably the best of the 
Rocky sequels).  See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).3 
Second, DSE and the Star Trek franchise could join forces with the defendants 
                                           
3 Stallone independently came up with the idea of Rocky fighting a Soviet 
boxing powerhouse.  See Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1161 (quoting Stallone 
interview in WACO TRIBUNE HERALD, May 28, 1982; Section D, pg. 1; Anderson 
did not prepare his treatment until June 1982). 
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to pursue a collaboration.  Much of the creative work has been done.  
Unfortunately, the defendants may have poisoned the well by taking such a 
cavalier approach to the projects.  Nonetheless, the possibility still remains for 
such a venture, subject perchance to an intergalactic peace treaty among the 
parties. 
Third, in appropriate cases (albeit not this one), derivative works could reach 
the public through a non-injunctive remedy, such as a running royalty damages 
award.  The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388 (2006), provides that  
a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test . . . 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at 
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
Id. at 391.  Judge Leval laments in his seminal pre-eBay article that  
[o]ne of the most unfortunate tendencies in the law surrounding fair use is 
the notion that rejection of a fair use defense necessarily implicates the grant 
of an injunction.  Many commentators have disparaged the overly automatic 
tendency of courts to grant injunctive relief.  The copyright statute and its 
predecessors express no preference for injunctive relief.  The 1976 Act states 
only that a court “may . . . grant temporary and final injunctions on such 
terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a 
copyright.”  Moreover, the tendency toward the automatic injunction can 
harm the interests of plaintiff copyright owners, as well as the interests of 
the public and the secondary user. Courts may instinctively shy away from a 
justified finding of infringement if they perceive an unjustified injunction as 
the inevitable consequence.   
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Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1130-31 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 1131-35; New 
Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 663 n. 1, 664 (2d Cir. 
1989) (Newman, J., dissenting) (advocating rehearing en banc and emphasizing the 
importance of the public interest in determining the availability of an injunction). 
Just as courts have fashioned a balanced framework for assessing fair use, the 
eBay decision affords courts an opportunity to develop a further safety valve that 
preserves incentives to create, balances compensation for authors, and promotes 
dissemination of cumulative creativity.  Such a doctrine has the additional virtue of 
avoiding distortion of the fair use doctrine.  See Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1131, 
n. 114 (confessing with the benefit of hindsight that his “belief that the [Salinger 
biography] should not be enjoined made [him] too disposed to find fair use where 
some of the quotations had little fair use justification”); Peter S. Menell & Ben 
Depoorter, Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use and Fair Licensing, 102 CAL. 
L. REV. 53, 80-81 (2014) (suggesting that a similar motivation might have been in 
play in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 
2006)). 
Those general considerations should inform the crafting of copyright doctrine.  
Nonetheless, there is little basis in this case to deny an injunction against continued 
dissemination of BOLDLY.  The harm to DSE appears serious and the blatant 
unjustified infringement favors DSE.  Furthermore, the publication of a mashup-
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inspired sequel does not rise to same public importance as the dissemination of 
vital historical information.  See Jon O. Newman, Not the End of History: The 
Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 12, 16 
(1990).   
Finally, Congress could reform the Copyright Act to ease the path for mashups.    
Advances in digital technologies have unleashed a digital tsunami that continues to 
reshape the content industries and the broader culture.  While these technologies 
have empowered creators and enabled them to reach vast audiences, they have also 
introduced new challenges deserving of legislative attention.  Cf. Peter S. Menell, 
Adapting Copyright for the Mashup Generation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (2016) 
(advocating a compulsory license for music mashups).  The present case highlights 
the bargaining leverage and transaction cost challenges facing upstart creators 
seeking to build on existing works.  There are numerous ways in which Congress 
could lubricate the wheels of progress.  See, e.g., Menell & Depoorter, supra, 
(proposing a novel mechanism that would afford a limited, cost-effective process 
for preclearing works, promote fair negotiation over cumulative uses of 
copyrighted works, and reduce the exposure of cumulative creators to the inherent 
risks of relying on copyright’s de minimis and/or fair use doctrines.)  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The District Court’s determination that a slavish, non-parodic, conventional 
mashup of a highly original illustrated book is “highly transformative” and 
constitutes fair use fundamentally misapplies the standards for fair use analysis, 
undermines the statutory right to prepare derivative works, and destabilizes 
essential copyright law principles that have long supported markets for 
collaborations and derivative works.  The court should reverse the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the defendants and order entry of judgment for the 
plaintiff. 
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